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   INTRODUCTION 
Consider this paradox: substantial political change including increasing political 
participation in Southeast Asia in the last decade has often been accompanied by a 
narrowing of the channels for political contestation. Neither the fact, nor the 
complexity, of political change in Southeast Asia or elsewhere has totally eluded 
theorists. Indeed, there is now greater recognition that this political change may be 
either heading in directions other than liberal democracy, or is manifesting in new 
variants of liberal democracy. The proliferation of so-called hybrid regime theory and 
the burgeoning literature on the quality of democracy reflects this. Such work has 
highlighted how problematic many of the ‘Third Wave’ transitions to democracy have 
proved to be. In the process, political institutions have been subjected to 
unprecedented detailed scrutiny and analysis by transition theorists in the attempt to 
characterise diverse political regimes.  
In acknowledging the possibility of sustainable alternative regimes to 
democracy, this literature appears to significantly depart from modernisation theory’s 
linear conception of political development that was implicit in earlier transition theory. 
But how adept is this work in explaining, as opposed to characterising, regimes that 
don’t seem to conform to prevailing ideal types of authoritarianism or democracy? 
What light can it shed on the particular paradox mentioned above? And just how far 
has it shifted from the primary assumptions of modernisation theory? 
We argue below that, despite opening up the question of sustainable 
alternatives to liberal democracy, this literature is theoretically constrained in 
accounting for such possibilities. In part this is due to the persistent preoccupation 
with understanding how to achieve democratic transition. This tends to steer analysis 
away from a full understanding of the forces behind different regime directions in 
favour of prescriptions to correct democratic institutional deficiencies. A related 
problem is the narrow framework within which analysis is conducted, whereby 
institutions loom large but their relationships to wider power structures are either 
ignored or under-theorised. For this reason, much of the debate about preferred 
institutional design to promote or improve democracy within this literature may be 
informed by idealist, liberal optimism rather than a realistic assessment of the 
foundations and dynamics of regime power. This is not to deny attempts have been 
made to incorporate socio-economic and structural factors into analysis, but these 
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implications for the exercise of power and related conflicts.  
The point of this paper is thus to both critically evaluate hybrid regime theory 
and to try and advance a different approach – one that aims to shift analytical 
emphasis towards understanding the reasons why political regimes take the forms that 
they do. Instead of asking whether or not a regime is deficient or defective as a 
democracy, we advocate examining the changing forms of political participation and 
representation to ask what is driving such developments. We argue that political 
regimes need to be identified not in terms of institutional attributes but in terms of the 
spaces of political participation they establish through certain forms of conflicts which 
are managed, ameliorated or contained. What is distinctive in our approach is that 
political regimes are analysed according to both political participation and the forms 
of conflict that are enabled by various terrains of political participation. The 
transitions literature with its obsessive emphasis on political culture and consensus 
neglects to ask what forms of conflict are mobilised by particular structures of political 
participation. 
By posing the research problem in this way we shift the focus of analysis from 
the identification of regime types to the processes of regime transition and refinement, 
including democratisation, particularly as these relate to underlying social conflicts. 
Therefore, the question that we need to address is not what the right set of democratic 
institutions may be, but rather, what kind of social conflicts do currently existing 
institutions organise into politics and, conversely, what kind of conflicts are organised 
out of politics? Political spaces are not neutral in their consequences – they can 
discriminate in favour of some conflicts being addressed while others are 
marginalised. In other words, the particular structuring of political space within the 
state – and in relation to the state – tells us a great deal about the nature of the 
conflicts and their management that are central to defining the political regime. 
One of the strengths of this approach is that it enables us to understand 
political regimes not as some finite set of institutional arrangements and procedures 
but as a historical process that is being constantly transformed by political struggles 
and conflicts associated with changing social and economic relations. Therefore, in 
contrast to procedural accounts identifying democratic and authoritarian regime types, 
we endeavour to conceptualise democracy as a political project of social groups 
seeking to create forms of political participation in order to protect or defend their 
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with a social and political base that helps explain the preferred forms of political 
participation. 
In our approach, political regimes are understood as the outcomes and 
expressions of conflicts and alliances of different interests. This can include economic, 
political and ideological interests, all of which may be better protected or defended in 
one historical period through a different political regime than in another historical 
period. New interests can also be generated by changed historical circumstances, such 
as economic globalisation, which can shift the balance of forces agitating for one or 
other form of political regime. The nature of political institutions must therefore be 
explained in terms of these larger dynamics and the factors shaping them.  
Our approach does not mean that we simply subordinate political institutions 
to underlying social conflicts, but rather that institutions themselves embody certain 
forms of conflicts and struggles. As such it is not the quality of institutions per se that 
is important but rather the type of conflicts that are privileged within various spaces of 
political participation. This framework allows us to explore the relationship between 
the emergence of arenas of political participation, such as the rise of informal politics, 
and new patterns of conflicts and interests. Therefore we ask not whether new 
institutions are good or bad for democracy, but rather what kinds of conflicts and 
contradictions do these institutions express?   
None of this is to dismiss normative concerns within the hybrid regime and 
quality of democracy literature about the establishment of democratic regimes. Rather, 
we maintain that certain forms of conflict being organized out of politics, and the 
marginalization of related interests, poses a fundamental problem for democratic 
prospects – and one that the prevailing theoretical literature is not equipped to 
recognize. 
Furthermore, our approach enables us to bypass some of the simplistic 
distinctions between authoritarian and democratic regimes to focus more sharply on 
the way spaces of political participations are constituted across a range of ostensibly 
authoritarian and democratising political regimes. The link between political regimes 
and conflict, not the characterisation of regime type, is central. Instead of reifying 
political institutions, we seek to explore the relationship between institutions, and the 
way conflict is organised and structured as a result of these institutions. We suggest 
that we can transcend the democratic/authoritarian regime type distinction because 
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spaces in Southeast Asia, and we assess their significance both for democratic regime 
transitions possibilities and alternative political regime trajectories. 
Political regimes viewed through the prism of institutionalism tend to reify 
institutional attributes so that the identification of attributes of regime types becomes 
an end in itself. We go beyond institutional analysis of regimes to locate such 
dynamics within these broader conflicts and alliances of interests and within the 
dynamics of state transformations and associated power structures. It is this 
institutionalist approach to political regimes that is most obvious in the bourgeoning 
hybrid regimes and so-called quality of democracy literature. It is nevertheless useful 
to explore this literature in order to highlight the distinctive ‘conflict’ approach that 
we take to the analysis of political regimes.   
 
THE PERILS OF INSTITUTIONALISM: HYBRID REGIME THEORY AND 
QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY 
The concept of the hybrid regime first surfaced in the early 1990s (Diamond 1993, 
O’Donnell 1994),
1 but it has been significantly developed and assumed increasing 
influence in the ensuing decade or so. Thought to be composed of democratic and 
authoritarian elements (Ottaway 2003, Case 2002), these regimes have been variously 
labelled as ‘delegative democracies’ (O’Donnell 1994), ‘pseudo-democracies’ 
(Diamond 2004, Volpi 2004), ‘defective democracies’ (Merkel 2004, Croissant 2004), 
‘illiberal democracies’ (Zakaria 2003), ‘limited democracies’ (Haynes 2001), 
‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky and Way 2002), ‘semi-authoritarianism’ 
(Ottaway 2003) and as a ‘halfway house’ (Case 1996a). Many of these terms have 
associated subtypes that attempt to further differentiate such regimes, and it is also not 
uncommon for some authors to use more than one term to describe essentially the 
same regime type.
2
By way of illustrating these concepts of hybrid regime, let us look briefly at 
some of the more influential variants. O’Donnell (1994) coined the term ‘delegative 
democracies’ in his analysis of presidential systems in Latin America to describe the 
way in which strong executives buttressed by electoral methods have often acted 
outside the process of liberal constitutionalism. Political participation in these regimes 
is not institutionalised either. O’Donnell (1994: 59-60) argues that  delegative 
democracies ‘rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is 
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existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office’. Following 
elections, ‘voters/delegators are expected to become a passive but cheering audience 
of what the president does’ (O’Donnell 1994: 60). Croissant (2003: 69) has 
subsequently elaborated on the mechanisms by which this ‘illiberal, super-
majoritarian’ regime secludes other formal and informal political actors from 
decision-making and eludes effective horizontal accountability.  
Other studies have pointed to how authoritarian governments use electoral 
methods to effectively neutralise political opponents. Levitsky and Way (2002), for 
example, coined the term ‘competitive authoritarianism’ to describe regimes where 
electoral mechanisms are used to consolidate the power of dominant incumbent 
parties while elections are substantively fair. Moreover, ‘formal democratic 
institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising 
political authority’ and they create ‘arenas through which opposition forces may – and 
frequently do – pose significant challenges’ (Levitsky and Way 2002: 54). Yet the 
rules of those institutions are so violated that this regime ‘fails to meet conventional 
minimum standards for democracy’ (Levitsky and Way 2002: 52). 
Ottaway’s (2003: 3) concept of semi-authoritarian regime emphasises 
ambiguities ‘that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of 
some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and 
political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits’. Furthermore, 
this ambiguous character is deliberate, part of a strategy meant to maintain the 
appearance of democracy ‘without the political risks that free competition entails’. 
However, despite the constraints on the contest for power, according to Ottaway 
(2003: 3), semi-authoritarian regimes permit sufficient space for political parties and 
civil society organisations to form, for an independent press to function to some 
extent and for some political debate to take place’. 
One of the most expansive recent accounts of the hybrid regime is provided by 
Merkel’s (2004) concept of defective democracy, which delineates between four 
subtypes: exclusive democracy, domain democracy, illiberal democracy and 
delegative democracy. Crucially, Merkel (2004) argues that none of these 
democracies are embedded through either internal or external institutions supportive 
of five interdependent partial regimes essential to genuine democracy: the electoral 
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govern.  
The concept of hybrid regimes has been deployed for some time in the 
analysis of politics in Southeast Asia. Indeed, as early as 1993 Case was adopting the 
term ‘semi-democracy’ to describe Malaysia (Case 1993, see also 1996a, 1996b). 
More recently, while emphasising the different degrees of intra elite cohesiveness in 
Southeast Asia, Case (2002) has depicted countries in terms of various modulations of 
hybrid regimes. These range from what he calls ‘stable semi democracy’ in Malaysia, 
‘unconsolidated democracy’ of Thailand, to the ‘low quality democracy’ of the 
Philippines. Crouch’s (1996) important work on Malaysia also identified a mix of 
democratic and authoritarian elements as central to regime stability in that country 
(see also Crouch and Morley 1993). In their particular elucidation of different hybrid 
regimes, Levitsky and Way (2002: 54) also refer to Singapore as a ‘façade electoral 
regime’. This regime is distinguished from competitive authoritarianism on the basis 
that ‘electoral institutions exist but yield no meaningful contestation for power’ 
(Levitsky and Way 2002: 54).  
In its earliest manifestations, the concept of hybrid regime was seen by some 
authors to capture what was thought to be a temporary detour from the transition to 
democracy.
3 Karl (1995), for example, depicted hybrid regimes as unstable and a 
stepping stone towards eventual democratisation. However, this position has given 
way more recently to an acknowledgement that these regimes are potentially more 
enduring. Ottaway (2003: 7), for instance, observes that ‘semi-authoritarian regimes 
are not failed democracies or democracies in transition: rather they are carefully 
constructed and maintained alternative systems’. Volpi (2004: 1061) also contends 
that pseudo-democracy ‘does not simply correspond to a deviation from a 
“democratic” normative framework and teleological order—a case of liberal 
democracy minus “x” or authoritarianism plus “y”—but that it forms a distinct 
analytical category and political phenomenon’. Similarly, defective democracies, 
according to Merkel (2004: 55), ‘are by no means necessarily transitional’. However, 
as will be explained below, breaking from the problematic of democratic transition to 
encompass a wider range of regime possibilities has proved difficult for hybrid regime 
theorists. 
Much of the focus of hybrid regime theory has been on countries that appeared 
to have made, or were on track to make, transitions to democracy in the early 1990s 
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these regimes, then, there has been a heavy preoccupation towards evaluating the 
democratic credentials of these regimes at the expense of a more open-ended enquiry 
into regime character. Literature on the quality of democracy, which emanated from 
the effort to audit institutions in established liberal democracies (Beetham 2004),
4 has 
been harnessed towards this end, helping to generate detailed check lists of the 
institutional features of, what has been portrayed as, different versions – and 
invariably degrees – of democracy.  
Terms like defective, semi and pseudo democracy only make sense in relation 
to a democratic ideal type and the literature on what constitutes quality or good 
democracy (Morlino 2004), so the integration of this literature into hybrid regime 
theory is understandable. Yet this preoccupation with measuring degrees of 
democracy has meant that description of regimes has often taken priority over their 
explanation. As a result, despite the concession at one level to the possibility of 
enduring alternative regimes, there is a striking emphasis on the analysis of 
institutions with a view to prescriptions for their improvement in democratic terms. 
This is not that far removed from the earlier modernisation and transition theory 
problematic premised on the assumption that liberal democracy is the natural regime 
to accompany advanced economic and social development. Moreover, prescriptions 
about preferred institutional design are rarely informed by a comprehensive analysis 
of the dynamics and power bases of existing regimes – a theoretical weakness that 
derives from the failure to locate institutions within wider social, political and 
historical processes. Instead, institutional reform prescriptions are often derived from 
an overly technical analysis. 
In this vein, Croissant (2003) describes the institutional make-up of the 
political systems in South Korea and the Philippines, focusing on the powers accorded 
to the president, the structure of the legislatures and judiciaries and the relationship 
between the branches of government. These, he argues, are significant for assessing a 
regime’s propensity to become a delegative democracy. Robinson (2003) in his 
examination of Russia’s ‘partial democracy’ also maintains that the effectiveness of 
the Duma as ‘a policy-making body and check on the executive has been hampered by 
its institutional structure’ (Robinson 2003:152). He cites Ostrow as saying that the 
Russian legislature has often been gridlocked because of its ‘unlinked, dual channel 
institutional design’ (in Robinson 2003:152). As a consequence, he contends, 
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democracy. Alternatively, Levitsky and Cameron (2003) turn their attention to the 
institution of the political party. They argue that the weakness of Peruvian political 
parties allowed former president Alberto Fujimori to dismantle the institutional 
checks on his power. Fujimori’s success has led to a further weakening of political 
parties in Peru. Political parties, say Levitsky and Cameron (2003:5), are ‘essential to 
achieving, maintaining, and improving the quality of democracy’. Consequently, they 
conclude their paper by examining the prospects for the re-emergence of political 
parties in post-Fujimori Peru. 
  What is clearly evident in this review of the literature is that the question of 
regime causation has generally been overshadowed by the new preoccupation with 
institutional auditing exercises. Moreover, where regime causation has enjoyed 
serious attention, there have been significant theoretical limitations to this that stem 
directly from the literature’s institutionalist bias.  
Certainly in the last decade various transition theorists adopting the hybrid 
regime concept have recognised the need to broaden their analysis to incorporate 
observations about factors conditioning the impact and scope of elites in shaping 
regime directions. Case (1996a: 440-41), for instance, has argued that elite behaviour 
is grounded in mass attitudes, social bases, and structural forces. Precisely how these 
are evaluated is the pivotal issue, though. He recommends ‘mapping the persistence of 
semi-democratic regimes’ and recognition of the importance of ‘constituents’ that 
‘can pose opportunities or constraints for elites and nudge the latter along semi-
democratic pathways’ (Case 1996a: 457). In a subsequent essay he contends: ‘…such 
half-way-houses can endure if institutions are designed appropriately to guide elites 
and mass behaviour along pseudo-democratic lines. Moreover, these institutions may 
be buoyed by countervailing historical and socio-economic undercurrents with some 
favouring democracy and others authoritarianism…’ (Case 2001: 44). Social conflicts 
are even recognised as important in shaping political regimes. 
Crucially, though, theorisation of these socio-economic factors is 
underdeveloped. Which particular societal forces seek to constrain or support 
authoritarian elites and why? Should we understand these forces in terms of classes or 
groups, or are they less structured? Are the conflicts between societal forces generated 
or exacerbated by capitalist development, or are they incidental to capitalist 
development? These are important questions that need address if we are to establish 
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elites have to contend with, or whether they fundamentally shape regime forms and 
possibilities. 
To be fair, notwithstanding theoretical limitations of the attempt, Case did at 
least recognise the importance of social conflict to regime formation and dynamics. 
Meanwhile, the modernisation theory idea that conflict shaping regime directions 
principally resides in a struggle of cultural values continues to assert itself and deflect 
attention from the structured interests often associated with conflict. Morlino (2004), 
for example, tries to explain the form of regime in terms of cultural traditions and 
values diffusion – especially among elites – despite references to the importance of 
the wider social and economic context of this struggle. These references never 
translate into a detailed or disaggregated identification of the interests or coalitions 
thereof, an essential precursor to any adequate theorisation of their importance to 
regime directions. 
However, there are signs that the relationship between conflict and the 
political mobilisation of societal forces is gaining recognition. Hawthorne (2004), for 
example, presents an interesting argument about the role of civil society in promoting 
democratisation in the Middle East that goes beyond much of the detailed procedural 
analysis in the hybrid regime literature. She maintains that civil society activism can 
only create a democratic opening if accompanied by broader social, economic or 
political changes. Moreover, she emphasises the need to differentiate between 
democratic and non-democratic elements seizing opportunities ensuing from these 
changes. Ultimately, though, her analysis is more developed in describing the 
contrasting political values of these elements than in explaining them. Nevertheless, 
this work is important in shifting attention to the political conflict embodied in civil 
society and the implications of this for regime change (Hawthorne 2004: 19). 
Ottaway (2004: 3) reinforces this direction in emphasising the importance of 
broad-based political organisations, including social movements and unions, for 
democratic institutions to take root. However, she goes a step further in maintaining 
that support for democratic ideals need not be essential for some societal forces to 
support democracy, so long as they can see their interests furthered by such a regime 
(Ottaway 2004: 6). This position on the contingent nature of support for 
democratisation by emerging social forces is elaborated on by Ottaway and Carothers 
(2004). In so doing, these authors expose the limitations of the culturalist account of 
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of this approach is not realised as democratic values tend to be portrayed in 
monolithic and static terms, rather than something negotiated through processes of 
conflict and co-option tied to concrete interests.  
Ironically, despite the highly normative connotations of his defective 
democracy concept and the fact that his approach is heavily oriented towards 
furthering the democracy audit approach to regime analysis, Merkel (2004) has an 
appreciation of the need to look deeply and historically into how regimes are 
embedded. Accordingly, he makes the broad recommendation that we should look to 
the work of Barrington Moore to ascertain the relationship between structured 
interests and the prospects of particular political regimes. Yet, as is elaborated on 
below, work building on Moore and other theorists situating political institutions 
within broader contests between economic and political interests pre-dates the hybrid 
regime literature. And extending on this work to identify detailed, historically-specific 
conflicts and coalitions of interests associated with contemporary capitalism is very 
much at the core of the approach we seek to apply to regime analysis in Southeast 
Asia.  
  Our argument is that situating the process of regime change in these contextual 
and dynamic terms enables us to go beyond the implicit teleological perspective 
which seeks to measure the quality of democracy against an abstract set of 
institutional standards. Much of the democratic transitions literature in one way or 
another seeks to locate actual political regimes against a hypothetical norm. Having 
found actual regimes in much of the developing world unable to meet these abstract 
standards, democracy itself is found to be compromised. In contrast, we suggest that 
what passes in the literature for hybrid regimes of defective or low quality democracy 
in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is the emergence of a distinctive political project that 
differs from that which distinguished democracy during the last century. But how do 
we demarcate these different periods? 
 
POLITICAL REGIMES AND REPRESENTATIVE POLITICS  
One way of demarcating these historical periods is through Eric Hobsbawm’s (1995) 
concept of a ‘short twentieth century’. For Hobsbawm the short twentieth century in 
Europe – and it remains a largely Eurocentric periodisation of the twentieth century – 
was framed by the socialist project, in particular, the social democratic view of liberal 
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important but the way democracy itself became intertwined with the broader class 
project. To quote Eley (2002: 21-22), following the lines of Hobsbawm’s ‘short 
twentieth century’, ‘… social democracy came to signify not only the most radical 
form of parliamentary government but also the desire to extend democratic precepts to 
society at large, including the organization of the economy’. What this argument – 
and similar arguments of those such as Therborn (1977) and Rueschemeyer, Stephens 
& Stephens (1992) – underline is the fact that the movements for democracy cannot 
be disentangled from the process of capitalist industrialisation and its associated social 
conflicts. Democratic projects themselves become a constitutive part of these social 
conflicts.  
In this sense, democracy is embedded within social and political relations. 
Eley (2002), for example, makes an essential distinction between earlier notions of 
radical democracy (agrarian?) that were organised around the civic virtue of a society 
of small property holders and local self government and a project of social democracy. 
The radical agrarian ideas of democracy reached their zenith in the events of 1848. 
But the advance of capitalist industrialisation – and the consequent social conflict – 
was transforming the conditions, the actors and the spaces through which democracy 
could be pursued. And crucial to this transformation of democracy was not just the 
emergence of socialist parties but the socialisation of democracy itself in terms of its 
meaning and purpose.  
The social conflict produced by industrial capitalism, then, is an important 
dimension of the democratic project of the short twentieth century. However, even 
more significant is the fact that this conflict has found a material expression in 
political spaces within the state. Above all, this is about structuring new forms of 
political spaces. What stands out as the core of these new political spaces is the 
emergence of the structures and organisations of representation – be they through 
political parties or trade unions. Indeed, the most visible and distinctive strand of this 
social democracy was the struggle for the representation of those interests and social 
relations that emerged from the process of capitalist industrialisation. But ‘political 
representation’ of this sort required the creation of new forms of political 
organisations and collective mobilisation. The most important of such organisations 
was the mass political party linked to various social and political forces and it is 
  11through these organisations that spaces of political participation itself were 
transformed.  
The structure and organisation of conflict through systems of representation 
provide a window into the changing nature of the social democratic project. These 
conflicts draw attention to the way in which the social democratic project has 
collapsed as a result of a complex mix of factors. These relate to the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc, the globalisation of economic relations and associated changes in 
economic governance, all of which served to constrain the capacities of parties to 
maintain and consolidate the post war social contract. Equally important were the 
structural changes within the domestic political economy, such as the movement 
towards flexible production structures. The cumulative effect of these changes has 
been a radical transformation of the social democratic project that formed the basis for 
the short twentieth century.  
But perhaps the most dramatic and noticeable transformation has been the 
decline of the mass political party that was the lynchpin of representative politics. The 
gradual erosion of the electoral organisational and ideological components of social 
democracy has weakened the capacity of social democratic parties to sustain the 
democratic project. In fact Moschonas (2002: 295) argues that ‘social democracy’ is 
on the verge of a change in identity because it is no longer capable of embodying that:  
social experiment of enormous proportions and because it is no longer capable of 
definitively turning its back on the logic -and politics- of  solidarity either. It thus 
finds itself in a strategic ‘inbetween’ (sic) because its identity is intermediate. 
The broader methodological analysis we wish to draw from the foregoing is 
that political projects find expression in the structuring and organisation of political 
space. And for much of the twentieth century this political space was provided 
through the terrain of representative politics. Indeed what is important for this 
research project is that this transformed social democratic project finds expression in 
the marginalisation or the collapse of the political spaces of representative politics. 
This then impels us to think concurrently about the way new political spaces are being 
formed inside and outside of the state.  
All this brings us to our major research question. Considering the decline and 
marginalisation of the political organisations and the imaginative communities of 
class, what are the consequences for democracy of the end of the short twentieth 
century and with it the disassociation of class and political organisation? What we 
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representative democracy constitutes a political regime that links spaces of formal 
political participation (representative politics) with particular structure of class 
conflict. As we have suggested, one major result of the transformed ‘social 
democratic project’ has been the restructuring of the political spaces around which 
representative politics (and its associated conflicts) were organised. The broader 
implication of this argument is that the structuring and organising of political space of 
participation provides us with a means of identifying the nature of a new political 
project, its key actors and driving conflicts.  
But how relevant is this argument outside of Europe? In the Southeast Asian 
context Hewison and Rodan (1996) have argued that far from democracy being an end 
point of an ongoing process of modernisation, it has rather ebbed and flowed 
throughout the twentieth century. More crucially, they note that pivotal to these 
democratic projects – in what amounts to Hobsbawm’s short twentieth century – has 
been the role of the ‘left’, a concept used in a broad way to define those movements 
and organisations committed to the ‘socialisation’ of economic relations. The 
significance of this study lies in the fact that it fits into the broad argument made here 
about the historical specificity of struggles for particular forms of political regimes.   
The attempt to build democracy following decolonisation in Asia has had to 
confront the political challenges associated with the conjunction of unfavourable 
geopolitical circumstances, late industrialisation and growing economic globalisation. 
In many countries, the Cold War has reinforced the capacity of authoritarian regimes 
to obstruct or contain independent labour movements and other potential structures 
through which social democratic politics can be prosecuted. This history of repression 
has resulted in the marginalisation of these social forces even in the context of the 
collapse of centralised and authoritarian structures such as in Indonesia (Robison and 
Hadiz 2004). If, as Eley (2002), Hobsbawm (1995) and others have argued, the 
imaginative constitution of class is a pivotal dimension of representative politics, then 
the history of repression has been to severely weaken those forces that might have 
sustained such an imaginative constitution of class.  
But even more significant here is the fact that the expansion of 
industrialisation and capitalism has taken place in a context different from that out of 
which representative democracy matured in Western Europe and elsewhere. Indeed, 
the idea of representation as a form of politics that acknowledges and institutionalises 
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neoliberal revolution. But these effects are much more profound in Southeast Asia 
where patterns of industrialisation and production structures have fragmented the 
working class in a way that constrains the mobilization and capacity for collective 
action (Deyo 2001). Southeast Asia is not unique. Roberts (2002) has observed that in 
Latin American the ‘incongruence between the social “fault lines” of Latin American 
societies and their institutionalized forms of political representation is unusually 
pronounced, and it appears to be growing’ (Roberts 2002: 3). The paradox he 
identifies is central to what we see as a pivotal problem for the prospects of 
democracy: that neoliberalism has on the one hand led to an extensive program of 
market reform and disciplines but, on the other hand, these very reforms have 
undermined the salience of class as a basis for collective action and identity.  
Further reinforcing this marginalisation of representative institutions is the 
pattern of late industrialisation. Late industrialisation has reinforced vertical rather 
than horizontal relationships between state and civil society. Hence the combination 
of neoliberalism and late industrialisation has led to the promotion of structures of 
capitalism characterised by the interdependence and inter-penetration of public and 
private power. In turn, this inter-penetration of public and private power implies that 
the boundary between public and private is much more indistinct than is assumed to 
be in forms of representative politics.  
This point was emphasised earlier by Hewison, Robison and Rodan (1993) 
when they cautioned against expectations that bourgeois and middle classes in 
Southeast Asia were necessarily forces for independent civil societies and 
democratisation. More recently, Bellin’s (2000) concept of ‘contingent democrats’ 
powerfully encapsulates and amplifies this theoretical position, arguing that ‘the 
peculiar conditions of late development often make capital and labor much more 
ambivalent about democratization than was the case for their counterparts among 
early industrializers’ (Bellin 2000: 178). For Bellin (2000: 179), ‘capital and labor 
will champion democratic institutions when these institutions are perceived as in their 
material interests’. These approaches take us further in deciphering the nature and 
determinants of the interests and conflicts alluded to by some hybrid regime theorists. 
They offer a means by which not only can Merkel’s concept of democratic 
embeddedness be developed, but by which alternatives to democratic political regimes 
might be better understood and explained. 
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of late development and neoliberal globalization relates to ideology. And what are the 
ideological legacies of colonialism that mediate the experience of late development in 
general and neoliberalism in particular?  
We posit that neoliberalism involves more than a set of economic programs; it 
entails a set of structural forces capable of undermining or marginalising the politics 
of class conflict. The question is, therefore, whether we are witnessing the 
development of forms of political participation that are alternatives to collective, 
class-based politics in particular – forms of representation that are historically 
grounded in social democratic politics. It is not the identification of the quality of 
democracy or regime type that is primarily important, but the nature of the 
identification and analysis of emerging forms of political participation and the forms 
of conflict which they serve to express or repress. Understanding this will shed light 
on more than the shortfalls of post-authoritarian regimes against democratic 
institutional criteria, it will also enable us to detect and explain the development of the 
full range of political regimes and the forms of conflicts associated with contemporary 
global capitalism. 
Hence in trying to understand regime character and trajectories in Southeast 
Asia, the analysis of new political spaces is of paramount importance. If, as Hewison 
and Rodan (1996) argued, the left was crucial to the ordering of political spaces 
during the short twentieth century, what defines the nature of the new political spaces 
that are being organised around the new political projects of participation of the last 
decade? More crucially, two core questions must be addressed to understand the 
trajectories of political regimes in Southeast Asia. First, what is the significance of 
informal patterns of political organisations and mobilisation for representative politics 
of class conflict? Second, how do formal representative political structures relate to 
systems of informal power? 
 
CONFLICT AND THE ORGANISATION OF NEW FORMS OF POLITICAL 
SPACE  
We hypothesise that a major restructuring of the state is underway in many Southeast 
Asian countries. New institutions and sites of governance are being created — often 
creating institutions with policy delivery capabilities that engage with organisations 
that are found at the interstices of civil society and the state. A distinguishing mark of 
  15these political spaces is that they seek to promote participation and are prone to use 
the language of empowerment; but at the same time this is paralleled by the 
marginalisation of traditional representative institutions and organisations – be they 
political parties or labour unions. Hence, paradoxically, while many of these 
institutional forms seek to promote participation, they stand in contradiction to the 
development of representative institutions seen as the instruments for political 
participation.  
There is obviously a great degree of variation in the nature and form of these 
new political spaces, but nonetheless they constitute an important shift away from 
formalised representative structures to more informal associations as centres of 
decision making. This includes shifts to: civil society organisations rather than 
political parties; governance through mechanisms such as transparency rather than 
formal political contestation; direct ‘populist’ appeals rather than deliberation in 
legislative assemblies; and ‘local’ rather national level representation. 
We therefore ask: Who gets represented? What forms of participation are 
allowed? What forms of contest are excluded? It is precisely towards an 
understanding of new forms of participation, and the notions of political 
representation they embody, that future research needs to be directed. One distinct 
advantage of this particular focus on political representation lies in the shift in 
analysis from the institutional attributes of political regimes to the manner in which 
emerging forms of politics may serve to constrain, as well as open up, avenues of 
political contestation. Another is the ability to detect and explain differential 
consequences for organised collective political action and representation resulting 
from economic liberalisation across the region. We need to examine how dynamics in 
the global political economy influence the capacities and inclinations of actors within 
Southeast Asia to articulate certain forms of conflict and suppress others. 
New forms of political participation need to be examined in varying ‘post-
authoritarian regimes’ where embryonic democracies are thought to be developing 
(Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines), as well as in authoritarian regimes that 
nevertheless appear to be undergoing political change, if not democratisation 
(Singapore and Malaysia). To differing extents, these represent significant departures 
both from established patterns of authoritarian rule and liberal democratic practices 
and values. It is our starting point that only through a detailed analysis of new forms 
of political participation are the various political regime characters, trajectories and 
  16wider implications understood. In particular, such an examination will enable us to 
test our hypothesis that the paradoxical juxtaposition of democratic and authoritarian 
elements represents the potential emergence of distinctive forms of political 
regulation that harness political participation to the foreclosing of certain forms of 
political contestation. The grounds of resistance and possible factors challenging their 
consolidation that differ in strength from country to country would also be a necessary 
part of such an approach.   
In exploring emerging political spaces, our approach gives priority to the 
identification and understanding of forms of conflict that are expressed or repressed 
through new institutions of political participation. The implications of such 
discrimination between different forms of political participation and conflict are 
profound for our understanding of what sorts of political regimes may be emerging 
and why. 
 
                                                 
NOTES 
 
1 Before the concept of hybrid regime was deployed, Diamond (1989) had already referred to 
‘semidemocratic countries’. 
2 Case, for example, has not only used the term halfway house, but also semi-democracy (1996a) and 
pseudo-democracy (2001). 
3 An exception to this is O’Donnell (1994: 56) who observed that delegative democracies ‘are not 
consolidated (i.e., institutionalized) democracies, but they may be enduring’. 
4 Beetham has been writing on democracy assessment since the mid 1990s, most notably in the 1999 
Audit Unit report on the quality of democracy in the United Kingdom (Weir, Beetham and Boyle 1999). 
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